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1.  Introduction 
The rapid contraction of the financial industry in 2007 - 2009 pulled many prices out of their 
usual orbits. Of the many resulting anomalies, perhaps none was as stark as the disparity in the 
Treasury market between bonds, i.e. Treasuries issued with 30 years to maturity, and notes, i.e. all 
other coupon-paying Treasuries. Bonds traded at a relative discount that reached six percent of face 
value, even with cash flows matched exactly. So extreme a violation of the law of one price indicates 
another strong force differentiating asset prices, and the notable remaining difference between off-
the-run bonds and notes is that the notes are more liquid. In this paper we ask how this seemingly 
modest liquidity difference, which normally commands a very small price, came to command such a 
large price during the crisis. The answers to this question help us understand not only this extreme 
event but also the whole range of market disruptions characterized by dramatic differences in relative 
pricing of comparable securities, such as the subsequent Treasury “flash crash” in October 2014 and 
the March 2016 spike in Treasury “fails,” and they also help evaluate the view that post-crisis 
developments have led to a lower-liquidity “new normal” in market quality.1 
Our investigation adapts the analysis by Dow (2004) of the role of investor clientele in 
amplifying illiquidity discounts. In Dow (2004), investors with more private information about the 
security’s payoffs select less liquid securities, and this selection lowers the liquidity further, which in 
turn increases the selection. So asymmetric information about payoffs can power a feedback loop that 
amplifies liquidity differences. We adapt this analysis to a setting where the power comes not from 
                                                            
1 A Joint Staff Report by the U.S. Treasury, “The U.S. Treasury Market on October 15, 2014,” investigates the 10-year 
Treasury note’s price volatility, stating that in the post-crisis market environment, traditional liquidity measures “may 
need to be complemented by other measures in light of these changes to obtain a more meaningful picture of the state of 
market liquidity in the current structure.”  A Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report, “What’s behind the 
March Spike in Treasury Fails,” investigates Treasury security settlement fails that spiked to a post-crisis high in March 
2016, averaging $95 billion per day over the month, in both on- and off-the-run securities. The report states that, “When 
fails materialize, the risk of a self-fulfilling dynamic arises whereby some large holders of benchmark issues become 
reluctant to lend if they fear that the securities will not be returned at the end of the loan.” 
 2 
 
investors’ private information about payoffs, but, as in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), from the 
investors’ need for liquidity. That is, we ask whether the feedback could instead be that investors who 
expect to hold a security longer select less liquid securities, which lowers liquidity and further 
increases the selection. The market for off-the-run Treasuries, where this price divergence occurred, 
presents an ideal opportunity to find out. 
The off-the-run Treasury market is ideal for three reasons. First, the precise identity between 
Treasury securities promising the same future cash flows isolates the effect of liquidity differences; 
their payments come from the same obligor with the same seniority, they are denominated in the same 
currency, they are subject to the same tax schedules, their trades settle the same way, they are equally 
valid as repo collateral, and are otherwise the same in every meaningful way.  But, the ease with 
which the securities are traded is free to vary. Second, the liquidity indeed varies widely; despite the 
consistently high liquidity of on-the-run Treasuries, liquidity differences among off-the-run 
Treasuries are large. As we document below, bonds trade at twice the bid-ask spread of ten-year notes 
on average,2 and the average of the time since the last buy or sell of a bond, on the platform that 
provided our data, is almost three days, over eight times longer than the same average for a ten-year 
note. And finally, for a large and varied group of Treasury traders, i.e. every U.S. insurance company, 
we see not only all their trades but also extensive data on their circumstances, particularly those 
relevant to investment horizons. So given the nature of the securities and the available data, the off-
the-run Treasury market is ideal to examine whether less-liquid securities fall to a further 
disadvantage by flowing to longer-horizon investors. 
Our Treasury market data source is key to this study, because the usual sources (e.g. eSpeed, 
Brokertec) reveal almost nothing about the off-the-run market. This is because the market segment 
they represent, the interdealer market, is not where off-the-run transactions take place. For example, 
                                                            
2 Throughout the paper, we refer to securities originally issued with n years to maturity as n-year securities. 
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one could not infer from interdealer data sources, and probably would not even suspect, that days go 
by between trades of an off-the-run bond. The major venue for off-the-run trading is not the 
interdealer market but rather the customer-to-dealer market, as shown on the TradeWeb platform,3 an 
online request-for-quote platform backed by the largest Treasury dealers. This is the source of our 
database, which gives key metrics of market quality, including bids and asks for each CUSIP, as well 
as the time since each CUSIP last traded. Thus, we not only see the transactions costs charged by 
liquidity providers to demanders, we also have a good proxy for how long the liquidity providers can 
expect to wait before a later trade takes any new supply off of their books. 
Figure 1 shows the evolution of the anomaly we study. Each line in Panel A represents the 
price of a ten-year note minus the price of a replicating portfolio that matches cash flows exactly, 
comprised of a bond and the bond’s principal STRIP.4  For example, the red line represents three 
securities that mature on 2/15/15: a 4% note issued in 2005, an 11.25% bond issued in 1985, and the 
principal STRIP from this bond. The line shows the price of the note minus the sum of  4 11.25  
times the price of the bond and  1 4 11.25  times the price of the STRIP, which is the net revenue 
from buying the note and shorting a portfolio with identical cash flows. Beginning in August 2007, 
the price of the note rises relative to the price of the replicating portfolio, and this price difference 
continues over the next two years to follow the familiar contours of the crisis.5  The pattern repeats 
across all pairs of notes and bonds extant at the time. Panel B shows the average price difference 
across all of the maturity-matched bonds and notes in our sample. 
                                                            
3 An independent market research report from February 2014 cites TradeWeb as the leading electronic U.S. Treasury 
trading platform. Greenwich Associates (2014) estimates that 25 percent of total fixed income trading volume is executed 
electronically, and that 45 percent of institutional investors use electronic platforms for at least part of their fixed income 
transactions. 
4 STRIPS stands for Separate Trading of Registered Interest and Principal of Securities. These are single cash flow 
securities formed from the individual coupon and principal components of Treasury coupon securities.  
5 A short time-series animation of the cross-section of actual Treasury yields illustrates the magnitude and systematic 
nature of the price divergences:  http://finance.wharton.upenn.edu/~kschwarz/movie.html. 
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The implicit arbitrage is significantly profitable even net of repo-market financing costs. 
When we assemble the components of the arbitrage from a database of concurrent repo transactions, 
we find that funding the short side of the trade offsets only a small fraction of the gross profit, so the 
explicit costs to establish the trade are small change relative to the price divergence.  
We analyze the divergence in three stages, the first of which identifies the cross-sectional 
determinants of illiquidity discounts. We start by subtracting from each security’s price the price 
implied by a smoothed yield curve, to then relate the cross section of relative prices to the underlying 
liquidity drivers, such as issue size, and the manifestations of liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads.  
We find a strong negative relation between measures of a security’s liquidity and the security’s 
relative price. Securities that are older, have smaller outstanding quantities, have been stripped less, 
have lower trading volume, and higher bid-ask spreads, all of which distinguish bonds from notes, 
trade at larger discounts. These relations become substantially stronger when market-wide liquidity 
declines, as happened during the crisis. Controlling for the aggregate state of liquidity over time, these 
security-specific liquidity variables account for most of the widening of the bond/note price gap.    
The second stage of the analysis identifies the investor clienteles attracted to the more- or less-
liquid securities. The key database for this identification is the universe of transactions in Treasury 
securities by all U.S. insurance companies, which we combine with extensive information on the 
insurers’ financial conditions. This database allows us to follow each insurer’s activity over twelve 
years, including the date, direction and identity of each security purchased or sold, while tracking the 
insurer’s changing circumstances, such as its leverage. Collectively, insurers hold about three percent 
of the stock of U.S. Treasuries,6 so they are not the largest aggregate clientele for these securities, but 
their circumstances vary in ways that we can observe, and that can influence their relative demand 
                                                            
6 The Federal Reserve’s Financial Accounts data, Table L.209, shows the combined holdings of Life Insurers and Property 
and Casualty Insurers, as of 12/31/2008, to be $171 Billion, compared with the $6.1 Trillion of publicly held Treasury 
securities (other than savings bonds) then outstanding (see http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/ z1r-4.pdf).  
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for more or less liquid assets. Thus, we can identify the investor characteristics and circumstances 
driving demand for the more liquid securities at their premium prices.    
Our principal result is that the insurers with more appetite for liquidity tilt increasingly toward 
the more liquid and expensive securities as their premiums increase. Those paying up for the liquid 
securities include those investors that generally trade more, and those with financial circumstances, 
such as high leverage, that indicate a need for more liquid investments. This result bears out the 
prediction of Amihud and Mendelson (1986) that less-liquid securities attract investors with longer 
horizons (distinct from the relationship between expected returns and liquidity that has been well-
documented in the literature), and because the selection increases with the premium price, it also bears 
out the view that the selection powered a feedback loop, amplifying the liquidity difference. 
The third stage asks how the liquidity difference came to command such a high price in the 
crisis. We answer this question by decomposing the cross section of bid-ask spreads into two prices 
charged by the liquidity provider: the price charged to finance the position until the next trade, and 
the price charged to bear the position’s interest rate risk over that time. We can do this because we 
have a large cross section of securities that differ in interest rate risk and also an excellent proxy for 
the expected time to the security’s next trade, i.e. the time since its last trade. We achieve the 
decomposition by regressing the cross section of spreads on the securities’ durations and the times 
since their last trades. Based on the estimated coefficients, the regression shows a sharper spike in the 
price charged for financing a position over a longer expected holding period than the price charged 
for bearing interest rate risk. That is, liquidity providers showed a particular aversion at the peak of 
the crisis to expanding their balance sheets to bridge the arrival of trades, and a less pronounced 
increase in aversion to bearing the securities’ price risk over this period. These prices fall and stabilize 
after the crisis, but while the price charged per unit of financing has remained stable, the quantity of 
financing risk has increased, i.e. more time elapses between trades, and this has widened average 
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spreads and the difference in spreads between more and less liquid Treasury securities. This effect 
persists until the end of our sample period. 
Putting the evidence together, the Treasury market experienced a large price divergence that 
presented a substantial arbitrage opportunity, net of funding costs, to willing traders. Differences in 
liquidity that normally command small prices came to command very high prices, which resulted in 
notable differences in bid-ask spreads within the market for off-the-run Treasury securities. 
Contributing to this amplification was a feedback loop driven by the selection of longer-horizon 
traders into less-liquid securities that intensified as the liquidity premium increased. The resulting 
differences in liquidity premia led to large differences in prices for identical securities.  
2. Background and Data 
In this section we first review the existing literature that relates liquidity to asset prices and 
discuss the findings on price discrepancies in the Treasury market. Next, we introduce the data that 
we use for our analysis. We describe our dataset of secondary-market Treasury security prices, which 
we complement with additional security-level data to form proxies for relative liquidity. We also 
describe the secondary market trading activity and portfolio holdings of Treasuries for U.S. insurance 
companies, which we use to gain insight into the trading activity of a large end-buyer of Treasuries. 
2.1. Literature Review 
 Amihud and Mendelson (1986) provide a formal treatment of the relation between bid-ask 
spreads and security prices. Since the bid-ask spread represents a cost of trading a security, it affects 
the ultimate return realized by investors. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) show that expected asset 
returns are increasing in the bid-ask spread, as investors demand a discount to buy securities that are 
more costly to trade. This effect persists when investors have different holding period horizons, but 
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it is somewhat muted. Clienteles with a long horizon rationally purchase securities with higher bid-
ask spreads, since the longer horizon makes the higher expected return attractive relative to the higher 
trading cost. Conversely, clienteles with a short horizon purchase securities with a low bid-ask spread, 
since the shorter horizon makes the lower trading cost more attractive. This selection of investors 
results in an increasing and concave relation of expected returns to bid-ask spreads, which Amihud 
and Mendelson (1986) confirm empirically using stocks traded on the NYSE.  
Dow (2004) endogenizes bid-ask spreads in a model with clienteles that vary based on private 
information and shows that there are strategic complementarities between investor security demand 
and the bid-ask spreads posted by market markers. Investors with less private information congregate 
into securities with lower spreads, which are justified due to the lack of adverse selection risk. 
Conversely, investors with more private information choose securities with higher spreads to 
capitalize more fully on their private information, which justifies the higher spreads and crowds out 
less informed traders. Dow (2004) shows that multiple equilibria are possible, with similar securities 
having either low or high liquidity. We conjecture that a similar feedback mechanism could operate 
through heterogeneity in investors’ trading horizon.           
Amihud and Mendelson (1991) empirically examine the relationship between bid-ask spreads 
and yields on Treasury securities. They compare the pricing of Treasury bills, which have an original 
maturity less than one year, and Treasury notes that have only six months remaining until maturity 
and thus are past their penultimate coupon payment. Both are pure discount Treasury securities, so a 
straightforward arbitrage relation exists. They find that the notes have wider bid-ask spreads and 
higher yields, so they allow profits for traders who do not try to unwind their positions before 
maturity. Thus the authors conclude that this is an illiquidity premium available to patient capital.7 
                                                            
7 Taxes also explained some of the variation in prices at that time (Kamara, 1994), but the tax code has been changed to 
remove this differential treatment of notes and bills. 
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A related comparison is between on-the-run, i.e. “new” securities, and just-off-the-run, i.e. 
“old”, securities. New securities tend to trade at premium prices, and this is generally attributed to 
their greater liquidity (e.g. Fleming (2003), Goldreich, Hanke and Nath (2005), Barclay, Hendershott 
and Kotz (2006), and Pasquariello and Vega (2009)). There is a predictable convergence that patient 
capital can wait for, in that the new security becomes old, and thus likely to trade in line with the 
existing old securities, when the next security is floated. However, Krishnamurthy (2002) finds that 
the cost of borrowing the new bond to short it tends to offset much of the profitability of this trade. 
Fontaine and Garcia (2012) extend the analysis of how a security’s age affects its liquidity by 
examining other pairs of Treasury securities with the same maturity but different age. They assume 
that age-driven price differences reflect liquidity, and from these pairs construct an index that is 
correlated with various measures of funding liquidity. Hu, Pan and Wang (2013) also construct an 
aggregate measure of liquidity from the Treasury market, which they term “noise,” as the square root 
of the mean squared deviation of individual Treasury yields from a smoothed curve. They interpret 
the measure as capturing liquidity shocks, which among other things show a local peak around the 
collapse of Bear Stearns and the global peak after the Lehman bankruptcy apparent in Figure 1. 
Matched-maturity comparisons are also possible between other securities that share the same 
creditworthiness. One such comparison is that of Refcorp bonds, which arose from the Savings and 
Loan crisis, with Treasuries, both of which are backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. Federal 
Government. Longstaff (2004) shows that Treasury securities often trade at a large premium over 
same-maturity Refcorp issues, and attributes this premium to current and expected liquidity. In the 
euro-area, Schwarz (2016) shows that the yield spread between comparable German federal 
government and KfW agency securities, which have an identical guarantee, is a real-time, tradable 
proxy for market liquidity and liquidity risk. Also, inflation-protected Treasury securities 
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economically equate to regular Treasury securities paired with inflation swaps, but as Fleckenstein, 
Longstaff and Lustig (2014) show, their prices moved far apart in the crisis.  
There is also a literature examining the relationship between liquidity and yields of corporate 
bonds, which includes Bao, Pan and Wang (2011) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhutter, and Lando (2010). 
It is more challenging to precisely pin down the liquidity component in yields of corporate bonds due 
to the influence of credit risk on bond prices. Liquidity tends to correlate with creditworthiness in the 
corporate market, making the effect of liquidity difficult to distinguish completely from the effect of 
creditworthiness. 
To summarize, there is generally a liquidity premium in securities markets, including in the 
Treasury market. Newer securities are more liquid and expensive than older, and the newest securities, 
the on-the-run, are the most expensive of all, due presumably to the intense focus of traders on these 
particular securities. Our analysis avoids confusion with this on-the-run effect by focusing exclusively 
on the off-the-run Treasuries. 
2.2. Data 
Treasury Transactions on the TradeWeb Platform 
We construct a dataset of daily observations for all nominal Treasury securities outstanding, 
including STRIPS. We begin with bid and ask price quotes from TradeWeb, a large electronic trading 
platform that specializes in customer-to-dealer trades of fixed income securities. We have this data 
from May 3, 2004 through September 30, 2011. We use TradeWeb, rather than the usual interdealer 
platforms (eSpeed, BrokerTec and GovPX) because the customer-to-dealer market is the primary 
venue for off-the-run Treasury market transactions. These data capture the trades of a variety of 
market participants (e.g. hedge funds, pension funds, insurers) with differing motives for trading. The 
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database flags the dates that each security is on-the-run, and we exclude those security-date pairs from 
our analysis. 
The TradeWeb data report outstanding quotes averaged across market makers at four moments 
each day: 8:05 AM, 3:00 PM, 4:00 PM and 4:45 PM (U.S. Eastern time). From June 2008 onward, 
the data also report for each security the time since the last buy and the last sell. We take the average 
of these two times and label the result TTT (i.e. time-to-trade). For our daily observations we choose 
the 3:00 PM snapshot for two reasons. First, the time since the last trade is likely to be more 
informative as an indicator of a security’s liquidity near the end of the trading day when most trades 
have occurred. And second, the 3:00 PM snapshot is likely more representative of general intraday 
liquidity as it is still within the window of high intradaily trading volume and moderate bid-ask 
spreads, before an end-of-day deterioration in market conditions (Fleming and Remolona (1997)).8    
We complement the TradeWeb data with a database of specials repo transactions from a large 
interdealer broker. Our repo sample contains all transactions intermediated by the broker from April 
1, 2004 through March 1, 2009. For each repo we see the identity of the specific security that served 
as collateral for the repo, the repo rate, the trade date, the settlement date, and the term. Not all 
securities are repoed on each day; on average, twenty percent of the maturity-matched bonds and 
notes have observable repo rates. To this repo database we add the daily general collateral (GC) rate 
reported by Bloomberg. 
Additional Liquidity Variables 
In addition to TTT we calculate three additional measures of a security’s current liquidity. 
From the TradeWeb data we have the percentage bid-ask spread, Bid-Ask, which is ஺௦௞ି஻௜ௗሺ஻௜ௗା஺௦௞ሻ/ଶ as of 
3:00 PM. For volume and relative trading volume, there is no publicly available data for trading of 
                                                            
8 None of our results are sensitive to this choice. 
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individual Treasury securities, so we use the insurance data described below. For each security on 
each day, we construct Volume for each security on each day as the sum of buys and sells of the 
security by insurers, scaled by the sum of all Treasury security trades by insurers that day.  
We gather data on security characteristics from the Treasury Department’s Monthly Statement 
of the Public Debt. We collect each security’s initial size and the fluctuation over time due to 
repurchases and re-openings. We also see fluctuations in the effective issue size due to stripping and 
reconstitution. These data are all end-of-month, which we match with the corresponding month of 
our daily variables. We construct ln(Out) as the log of the principal outstanding and Share Stripped 
as the share of the security’s principal outstanding held in stripped form. From the issuance and 
maturity dates, we calculate ln(Age) as the log of the time since issuance and ln(TTM) as the log of 
the time remaining until maturity. The last two variables are computed daily. 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for the liquidity variables, along with some additional 
information about the securities, and it highlights significant variation across securities with different 
original-issue maturities. 30-year bonds, in particular, are notably less liquid by all of the measures. 
The average quoted percentage bid-ask spread is 3 basis points on average across all securities, but 
nearly 7 basis points for bonds alone. Bonds also trade far less frequently than other Treasuries; their 
average TTT is almost 3 days, compared to 8 hours for a 10-year note. Bonds are also much smaller, 
older, and more stripped, on average, than other securities.  Consistent with prevailing interest rates 
at their time of issue, bonds also have higher coupons and shorter duration, on average, than notes.  
Trading and Holdings Data for Insurance Companies 
Our final dataset reports the transactions in and holdings of Treasury securities by U.S. 
insurance companies, from January 1, 1998 through December 31, 2011. U.S. insurance companies 
are required to report every purchase and sale of a Treasury security, indicating the date, size, and 
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direction of each transaction, and to report their quarter-end holdings of each security. These data are 
packaged and resold by eMaxx.9  We limit our sample to the 2,321 insurers that show holdings and 
transactions in coupon Treasury securities, including STRIPS, and that also can be matched with 
accounting data from SNL Financial over the same sample period as our Treasury price data, from 
2006 through 2011.10 
For each insurer we calculate two statistics summarizing its trading activity over the sample 
period. To calculate how long an insurer tends to hold a position, we calculate Holding Horizon as 
the volume-weighted average number of days between the purchase and sale of each Treasury security 
that the insurer trades.11  The average Holding Horizon, reported in Panel A of Table 2, is about 2.5 
years. For a measure of portfolio turnover we compute Churn, which is an insurer’s average trading 
volume per month in Treasury securities divided by its average holding of Treasury securities.12  The 
mean value of Churn is 0.08 in Panel A of Table 2 indicates that the typical insurer trades about 8% 
of the portfolio each month. Since Holding Horizon tends to decrease and Churn to increase as an 
insurer trades more, they are negatively correlated across insurers; Table 2, Panel B, reports a 
correlation of -0.34.  
 From the SNL Financial accounting data we construct several measures of insurers’ financial 
strength and liquidity. Capital/Assets is a measure of the leverage of the insurer, where Capital is an 
                                                            
9 The original data from eMaxx is at the level of insurer-date-CUSIP-investment advisor, and we aggregate the data to 
insurer-date-CUSIP by summing transactions that have identical insurer, date, and CUSIP. eMaxx is a Reuters subsidiary 
that obtains the source data from the statutory filings of regulated insurance companies.  
10  We construct our insurer trading style variables with the 1998 through 2011 sample period, but for all of our analysis, 
we use the 2006 through 2011 sample period. 
11 Holding horizon measures the average number of days that insurer j holds a security i in its portfolio. 
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accounting measure of policyholder surplus, and Assets is the book value of total assets.13  Annuity is 
an indicator variable equal to 1 if the insurer sells more annuities than life insurance or 
property/casualty insurance, and equal to 0 otherwise. As discussed in McMenamin et al. (2012), 
annuities provide customers with some ability to withdraw their savings, which creates liquidity risk 
for insurers. RBC is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the ratio of actual capital to risk-based capital, 
measuring the insurer’s capital adequacy, is greater than the median for all insurers in our sample, 
and 0 otherwise.14  Finally, Net Income is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the insurer’s net income 
is positive, and 0 otherwise. 
3. Explaining Relative Price Differences in the Cross-Section  
3.1. The Divergence and the Arbitrage 
In this section we document the divergence and gauge the cost of trading on it, which is 
determined by the relevant repo rates. In the days after the Lehman bankruptcy, there are additional 
considerations arising from the high propensity of delivery fails. 
 On 11/20/08, Treasury coupon securities closed the day at the yields displayed in Figure 2. 
The figure highlights nine bonds (shown with blue asterisks) that share a maturity date with a note 
(black dots). All of the matching notes are 10-year Treasuries. Because their maturity dates match, 
they pay principal and coupons on the same dates. But, the bonds date from an era of higher rates, 
and thus have larger coupons, which imply lower yields in an upward sloping yield curve. However, 
the bond yields on this date are instead much higher. So the bonds appear to be significantly cheap 
relative to the notes, and the coupon difference makes the differential even more surprising.15  
                                                            
13 The vast majority of insurers are private, so it is impractical to use market values. 
14 Merrill, Nadauld, Sherlund, and Stulz (2012) show that insurers with below-median levels of regulatory capital were 
more likely to sell securities at fire sale prices during the recent financial crisis.     
15 The bonds with more than ten years remaining to maturity follow a curve largely consistent with the nine highlighted 
bonds, but the absence of matching notes prevents a precise comparison of their prices.  
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 For an exact comparison we construct an exact match by using the bond’s principal STRIP. 
The cash flows of a note with coupon NC  are replicated by a portfolio with  N BC C  of a bond with 
coupon BC  and  1 N BC C  of the bond’s principal STRIP.16  We subtract the price of this 
replicating portfolio from that of the note (using the midpoint of bid and ask prices), yielding the time 
series plots in Figure 1 which show the large divergence. 
Did this divergence offer a profitable trading opportunity? To trade on the divergence, one 
must short the note, buy the matching portfolio of the bond and its STRIP, and wait for convergence. 
Shorting the note is generally accomplished through the repo market by lending cash and accepting 
the note as collateral. The interest rate earned on the loan depends on the demand to borrow the 
specific security. For generic securities that are not in high demand, the repo rate is the GC rate. For 
securities in high demand – those deemed “special” – the repo rate will fall below the GC rate. The 
bond purchase can also be financed through the repo market, where the GC rate is the highest rate 
one would generally pay. The net cost of financing the arbitrage trade is the difference between the 
GC rate paid to finance the purchase of the bond and the potentially special rate paid to short the note.  
We gauge this carrying cost by reference to the rates in the repo database. On each day, we 
take the repo rate for any of the notes in Figure 1 to be the average rate across the repos of any of 
those notes on that day (the database does not show a repo transaction for each security on each day).17  
If there are no repos of those notes that day, we take the repo rate for any of the notes to be zero, 
which is the lowest rate for any repo in the database.18  So our estimate assumes that repo rates are 
                                                            
16 We use bond principal strips throughout, as note principal strips are relatively scarce (see Table 1). 
17 Our data shed light on financing costs, but there are necessarily some limitations on what they can illuminate due to 
the short maturity of the typical repo transaction and the much longer term over which an investor might potentially 
wish to hold the trade. In our database, 82 percent of the transactions are overnight, so we estimate the realized 
financing costs of a hypothetical investor by stringing together a series of overnight rates. Both Duffie (1996) and 
Jordan and Jordan (1997) use exclusively overnight repo data, and Keane (1996) states that term repos longer than 90 
days are in practice not available.  
18 There are 834 zero-rate overnight Treasury transactions in our repo database, but none with a negative rate.  
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similar across the notes, which are likely to be special due to the arbitrage opportunity (Duffie (1996)), 
and also assumes the worst-case scenario when no rates are observed. We further assume the worst-
case scenario for financing the long leg by assuming the trader pays the GC rate, i.e. the rate that 
imputes no scarcity rents because the money borrower is indifferent to which Treasuries are provided 
as collateral. 
The financing rates are plotted in Panel A of Figure 3, which shows the GC rate as the solid 
black line and note rate as the dotted blue line, throughout our repo sample period. The key quantity, 
the trade’s net funding cost, is the difference between these rates, which is generally small; it is 
between 0 and 23 basis points on 75 percent of the days in our sample period. It spikes on occasion, 
but not in late 2008, which is the period of greatest divergence between prices in the cash market. At 
that time, the latitude for high net funding costs narrowed, as the overnight GC rate declined in line 
with the policy-driven overnight Fed Funds rate, and the special repo rate did not become negative. 
The carry cost of the trade was therefore reduced to almost zero. Panel B of Figure 3 plots the 
cumulative funding cost, from the beginning to the end of the sample period, as implied by the 
difference in rates from Panel A. The realized financing cost of the trade, from February 22, 2008, 
the date the average divergence across bond/note pairs first rose above 1 percent, to the end of our 
sample, long after the divergence subsided, is just 0.21 percent. A trade established at the very peak 
of the average divergence, on December 16, 2008, and unwound at the end of our sample, would have 
cost only 0.02 percent. From this we conclude that the financing costs were small relative to the 
apparent arbitrage opportunity. 
The low cost of financing the arbitrage trade at the time of greatest apparent opportunity raises 
questions, most immediately whether this is really the cost that a hypothetical trader would have paid. 
Krishnamurthy (2002) shows that the estimated financing costs borne by well-positioned traders are 
in the neighborhood of the gross profit implied by the on-the-run Treasury price divergence. In a time 
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of extreme market stress, it stands to reason that some traders would not be able to access financing 
at all, even in collateralized markets. Thus, the costs in Figure 3 are best characterized as the costs 
facing a large trader. 
Another question raised is why the specials rates do not fall below zero when there is likely 
strong demand to borrow particular securities. Repo rates are not bounded below by law or any other 
convention, and indeed, negative rates have occurred after the sample period. The answer likely lies 
in a trader’s alternative to fail to deliver a shorted Treasury, i.e. to simply not deliver the security to 
the buyer, who would then not pay for it until it is delivered. As Evans et al. (2009) note, a delivery 
fail is economically equivalent to a repo rate of 0, plus any expected cost of getting bought in, i.e. the 
expected cost arising from the trader’s prime broker buying the security in order to deliver it, thereby 
ending the short and generating transactions costs. 19  So if these expected costs are sufficiently small, 
a short-seller would benefit from failing, rather than accepting a negative repo rate. That the 
alternative to fail was available and attractive is apparent in the incidence of both Treasury repos and 
Treasury delivery fails (as reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York), shown in Panel C of 
Figure 3. In late 2008, the number of weekly repo transactions in our database reveals a steep drop, 
suggesting a combination of low demand to arbitrage (e.g. Gorton and Metrick (2012), Mitchell and 
Pulvino (2012)) and reluctance to arbitrage specifically through the repo market. The steep concurrent 
rise of fails indicates that at least some of this drop reflects substitution from repos to failing, and the 
option to fail placed a floor under repo rates that limited the cost of financing the arbitrage.  
To summarize, the carry cost we estimate from repo transactions is low relative to the price 
divergence. The low carry cost in the months after Lehman is likely best representative of the best-
situated traders, so there could have been traders who wanted to profit from the divergence but could 
                                                            
19 A new market convention adopted in May 2009 made it much more costly to fail to deliver a Treasury security by 
imposing a penalty for failing. 
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not exploit it. The low cost was supported by the option at that time to fail to deliver, which protected 
traders from negative repo rates. Traders could have expected costs to run higher, and for the 
divergence to expand or persist more than it did, but to the extent the data can reveal, the relative 
prices of notes and bonds presented a feasible arbitrage opportunity for patient capital. The next 
subsection addresses the role of relative liquidity in relative pricing by analyzing the relation between 
liquidity and prices for the full set of off-the-run Treasury securities.  
3.2. Relative Pricing of All Treasury Securities  
In this section, we relate the pricing of Treasury securities to their liquidity. We consider both 
the standard measures of liquidity, such as bid-ask spreads, and the potential fundamental drivers of 
liquidity, such as issue size and age. The goal is to establish both the general cross-sectional relation 
and also the change over time through the sample period, which runs from 2006 to 2011, so from 
before to after the crisis. For this estimation we expand our sample from the maturity-matched pairs 
to the universe of off-the-run coupon Treasury securities. 
To expand the analysis beyond same-maturity pairs, we need to first calculate a baseline price 
for each security on each day. We do this by first fitting a smooth yield curve to all the securities, 
using the six-parameter model of instantaneous forward rates developed by Svensson (1994),20 then 
computing for each security the price implied by this curve, and finally subtracting this implied price 
from each security’s actual price. We call this difference the security’s “fitting error” for that day, 
denoted FEit for security i on day t. The mean fitting error is by construction close to zero (not 
precisely zero, since prices are not linear in yields), and the root mean square of the fitting errors on 
each day is similar to the aggregate noise measure in Hu, Pan and Wang (2013). The fitting errors 
line up well with the price differences of the exactly-matched pairs in Figure 1; the average fitting 
                                                            
20 See Gürkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) for a discussion of the methodology:  
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2006/200628/200628abs.html 
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error across 30-year bonds becomes significantly negative during the crisis while the average across 
10-year notes becomes significantly positive, and the difference peaks at around 6 percent on the 
same dates.  
We relate the fitting error to liquidity with pooled cross-sectional, time-series regressions. 
Each independent variable differs across securities in ways that could affect its relative liquidity. We 
include Bid-Ask and Volume to capture the variation of realized liquidity across securities and time. 
Existing research identifies both age (Amihud and Mendelson (1991), Fontaine and Garcia (2012)) 
and principal amount (Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005)) as potential drivers of liquidity, so we 
include ln(Age), time-to-maturity as ln(TTM),  issue size outstanding as ln(Out), and Share Stripped 
in the analysis. While existing research does not, to our knowledge, associate coupon with liquidity,21 
the difference in coupons between bonds and notes is quite large, so we include Coupon as a control 
variable. Panel B of Table 1 shows that age, coupon, and share stripped are all highly correlated, 
which makes it difficult to distinguish their separate effects in a multiple regression. Accordingly, we 
run simple regressions on each. Finally, we include an indicator for the maturity-matched bond/note 
pairs. This Net Long Matched Pair indicator is set to 1 for the notes in the pairs and -1 for the bonds, 
so that the estimated coefficient captures the average difference in prices between the maturity-
matched securities. 
The regression model takes the general form: 
 it it itFE Liq          (1) 
where itLiq is a set of liquidity variables specific to security i on day t. Because FE increases with the 
security’s relative price, a positive loading on a variable indicates a liquidity premium associated with 
                                                            
21 Conceivably, high-coupon securities could be bid up by agents investing on behalf of consumers who don’t understand 
the tradeoff between higher current yield and bigger subsequent capital losses (see, e.g., Donnelly (1988)). 
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that variable. We report the results, in Panel A of Table 3, from a simple regression for each 
independent variable and three multiple regressions with different sets of the independent variables. 
 The simple regressions find premia consistent with the literature; securities are more 
expensive when they are newer, larger and less stripped, and when they have lower spreads or trade 
more frequently. The price is also higher for securities with lower coupons, which also distinguishes 
notes from bonds, but the correlation between coupons and age and size makes this hard to interpret. 
In the multiple regressions, most of the premia persist but the effects of coupon and age are not stable, 
potentially due to their high correlation; older bonds issued in the 1980s have relatively higher 
coupons than notes that have the same time remaining to maturity. The note/bond price difference 
detected by the matched-pair indicator alone is cut by more than half with these dimensions of 
liquidity controlled for. 
The model in Panel A fits static coefficients and thus captures the general relation of the 
liquidity variables to prices in the cross section. However, we are interested in understanding how 
differences in liquidity contributed to the widening of price differences during the crisis. Panel A of 
Figure 4 suggests that the impact of fundamental differences strengthened during the crisis. The figure 
plots the average fitting error by a security’s size quartile. The figure illustrates the relationship 
captured by the regression results; on average, securities in the smaller quartile have lower prices. 
However, the difference in prices in the entire cross-section of securities varies notably over time and 
shows a pattern quite similar to that of the bond/note pairs alone.  
To capture time-series variation in the contribution of liquidity to prices, we allow the 
coefficients in equation (1) to vary over time with an index of market-wide liquidity. A positive 
loading on this interaction means that the variable’s contribution is bigger when aggregate liquidity 
is worse. Our index, labeled AggLiqt for day t, is the average bid-ask spread across the universe of 
securities that day, shown in Panel B of Figure 4. The average spread rises from around 2 basis points 
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pre crisis to much higher levels around Lehman before drifting back down, though not all the way to 
where they started. This pattern is stronger among the less liquid bonds, whose spreads exceed 20 
basis points at the widest. These Treasury-market results are consistent with the equity-market results 
in Acharya and Pederesen (2005), where the most illiquid securities show higher sensitivity to 
changes in market liquidity. 
The adapted model allows the equation explaining relative prices to vary across days by 
allowing the coefficients to vary through interaction with the index, and allowing the intercepts to 
vary through daily fixed effects. Thus, we fit the model 
FEit = atDt + bLiqit + γLiqit*AggLiqt + εit 
where D is an indicator for day t, and Liq is a set of liquidity variables. We repeat each regression 
from Panel A with this expanded specification; results (omitting the coefficients on the daily 
indicators) are in Panel B of Table 3. 
 The specifications on the left-hand side of Panel B find a consistent result; the interactions of 
the individual liquidity variables are significant in the same direction as the uninteracted coefficients 
in Panel A, and their importance increases. As aggregate liquidity worsens, these variables explain 
even more of the general relation between liquidity and pricing. For example, the coefficient on 
BidAsk in Panel A is -3.42, so on average, a 1 basis point wider spread associates with a 3.42 basis 
point lower price. In Panel B, the coefficient on the interaction of BidAsk with AggLiq is -0.34. Since 
AggLiq increases by about 6 basis points during the crisis peak (from 2 basis points pre-crisis to 8 at 
the peak of the crisis), this implies that the price discount associated with a 1 basis point wider spread 
increases by (6)(0.34) = 2.04 basis points at the peak of the crisis. 
In the multiple regressions, issue size and share stripped stand out as contributors to the 
divergence of prices. We can get a back-of-the envelope sense of this contribution by combining the 
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point estimates from the regression with the summary statistics from Table 1. The average amount 
outstanding is 12.08 for bonds and 28.24 for 10-year notes, and ln(12.08)-ln(28.24) = -0.85. So the 
coefficient of 10.5 on the interaction of AggLiq with ln(Out) associates the 6 basis point increase in 
AggLiq with a (10.5)(6)(-0.85) = 54 basis point decrease in the price of bonds relative to 10-year 
notes. Also, 21 percent of the average bond is stripped, compared to just 2 percent of the average 10-
year note, so the increase in AggLiq implies a (-48.84)(6)(0.21-0.02) = 56 basis point decrease in bond 
prices relative to 10-year notes.  
These liquidity variables explain almost two thirds of the bond/note disparity. In the regression 
including only the bond/note pair indicator, the 32.36 loading on the indicator implies a divergence 
of 3.9% due to the decrease in aggregate liquidity (i.e. 32.36(6)(1-[-1]) = 3.9%). However, when we 
include the liquidity variables in the regression, the loading falls to 12.32, which implies just a 1.5% 
divergence not explained by these liquidity measures. 
  To summarize, we find that relative liquidity – as reflected in both the underlying drivers of 
liquidity such as issue size and the manifestations of liquidity such as bid-ask spreads – explains much 
of the general price difference in the cross section of Treasury securities, and in particular, explains 
most of the widening of prices to their extreme disparity during the crisis. In the next section we 
address the dynamics of this widening, in particular the feedback from the trading horizons of 
investors buying the different securities to the securities’ subsequent liquidity. 
4. Liquidity Feedback Generated by Investor Trades 
With the insurer data, we can line up an investor’s decision to buy or sell notes or bonds with, 
on the one hand, the securities’ current relative prices, and on the other hand, the investor’s general 
trading style as well as its current financial stress. We can therefore see how the demand for the more 
liquid security evolves as the price of liquidity changes and as the investor’s liquidity needs change. 
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We gauge an insurer’s trading style from its trading history and its financial stress from its 
balance sheet. The trading variables are designed to reflect liquidity needs arising from an insurer’s 
style: Churn increases with an insurer’s portfolio turnover and thus likely reflects its general demand 
for liquid securities, and Holding Horizon increases with an insurer’s propensity to hold onto its 
investments, and thus likely decreases with its demand for liquid securities. The financial-stress 
variables include Capital/Assets, RBC and Net Income, which all increase with the health of the 
insurer and thus point to lower stress, and Annuity, which indicates that the insurer is potentially 
subject to the need for emergency liquidation of securities. As in Coval and Stafford (2007) and 
Merrill, Nadauld, Sherlund, and Stulz (2012), the financial stress captured in variables such as these 
likely increases the insurers’ demand for liquidity in their investments. 
The empirical question we address is how an insurer’s relative demand for a security varies 
with the security’s fitting error, which provides a useful estimate of a security’s relative price. 
Accordingly, the dependent variable is the net purchase of security i by insurance company j in month 
t, expressed as a fraction of the total principal amount of the security, i.e. NPi,j,t = (Buysi,j,t – 
Sellsi,j,t)/Outstandingi,t. We aggregate across the days in each month due to the sparseness of off-the-
run trades. Because we aggregate the trades within the month, we also average the fitting error within 
the month, so the regression takes the form 
 ijt it ijtNP FE     . (5) 
As before, FE is in price terms so a positive value indicates a relatively rich security. We estimate the 
regression first for the entire set of insurers, and then for each of the three insurer types separately. 
The regressions also include calendar month-of year fixed effects and insurer-type fixed effects.  
Table 4 shows the parameter estimates for equation (5). The first column indicates that 
insurers as a group demand a Treasury security more when its price is relatively high. The next three 
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columns show that this result holds for each of the three classes of insurers, although the effect appears 
largest for the life insurers, showing an 8.27 coefficient. To give economic interpretation to this 
estimate, we aggregate over all 571 life insurers in our sample (Table 2), and find that a one percentage 
point increase in a security’s relative price leads to a $473,044 increase in net purchases of the security 
(571 ൈ 827), for every $1 billion outstanding of the issue, or roughly 0.05 percent of the total issue. 
This means that, on balance, insurers traded in the direction that would widen, rather than narrow, the 
price differentials among different Treasury securities.   
To identify the role of the insurers’ individual circumstances in their relative demands, we 
modify equation (5) to allow the intercept and slope coefficient to vary for each insurer, so that the 
equation becomes  
  ijt j j it ijtNP FE      (6) 
We moreover assume that the intercept and slope are linear functions of the trading-style and 
financial-stress circumstances of the insurer, collected in a vector, j : 
 ,j j j ja b c d        (7) 
Substituting equation (7) into equation (6) yields 
 ijt j it it j ijtNP a b cFE dFE        (8) 
which we then estimate in a pooled regression. The main object of interest is the coefficient on the 
interaction term, d, as it tells us whether an insurer’s particular circumstance makes it more or less 
likely to buy the relatively expensive securities.    
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The results from estimating equation (8) are shown in Table 5, with the insurer characteristics,
j , entering individually in the first six columns, and together in the last column. Among the 
individual results, the trading-style variables associate liquidity demand with buying the relatively 
expensive securities. Investors with shorter average holding periods (Holding Horizon) and more 
frequent portfolio turnover (Churn), both show an insurer’s net purchases increase with relative price. 
The estimates on the insurer’s financial variables also associate higher stress with demand for the 
more expensive securities; higher leverage and exposure to annuities both relate significantly to 
higher demand for liquid securities. In the multiple regression, these variables retain the sign and 
significance as in the simple regressions. Moreover, controlling for these characteristics drastically 
reduces the size of the coefficient on the fitting error, suggesting that the relationship between trading 
and prices is concentrated in certain types of insurers. To consider one comparison, the sensitivity of 
purchases to the fitting error is, at the point estimates, about three times greater for insurers with 
annuity exposure than for those without.22   
These results show liquidity clienteles concentrating in the respective groups of securities as 
the price of liquidity grows. This gives new and direct empirical evidence of the clientele prediction 
from the Amihud and Mendelson (1986) model of the bid-ask spread; assets with higher bid-ask 
spreads are allocated in equilibrium to portfolios with the same or longer expected holding periods.23  
It is also in the spirit of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), in that their model connects varying 
investor constraints to rapid increases in the price of liquidity.24    
                                                            
22 This calculation is based on comparing the coefficient estimate on interaction of Annuity and the fitting error, and the 
coefficient on the fitting error alone.  
23 The clientele prediction differs from the positive and concave relationship between an asset’s bid-ask spread and its 
return, which is consistent with our finding in section 3, equations (1) and (2), and has already been empirically tested in 
the literature. 
24 The Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008) model relies on differences in margin requirements between securities. 
Krishnamurthy (2010) shows that repo haircuts for short-term Treasury securities averaged 2 basis points from the Spring 
of 2007 through the Spring of 2009, and haircuts for long-term Treasury securities ranged from 5 to 6 basis points over 
the same period.  
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To summarize, the insurance-company transactions show that investors select into securities 
according to their need for liquidity, and that this accelerates as the price of liquidity increases. Self-
selection of insurers that trade less frequently into less liquid securities would tend to lower the 
securities’ liquidity even further as they become even less traded. This is consistent with a feedback 
loop where an illiquidity discount begets a larger discount, due to the expectation that the security 
will trade less, and this expectation should correspondingly widen bid-ask spreads. For this 
mechanism to work, spreads should widen over time as trading slows down. Thus, the last empirical 
section asks how the changing rate of trading affects the change in bid-ask spreads over time. 
5. Liquidity Provider Risk Pricing 
A security’s bid-ask spread is the price charged by liquidity providers to absorb temporary 
imbalances in security supply and demand. Panel B of Figure 4 shows a near quadrupling in the 
average bid-ask spread from before the crisis to its peak, and Panel A of Figure 5 shows a particularly 
dramatic spike in the average bid-ask spread for 30-year bonds as compared to 10-year notes. This 
variation across securities and over time raises two main questions. First, how much of the spike 
reflects a higher price charged to provide the same liquidity, and how much represents a larger 
quantity of liquidity being provided? And second, which elements of liquidity provision were 
responsible for the high spreads? Is it the price of carrying the position on the balance sheet until the 
next trade, or the price of bearing the security’s interest rate risk exposure? We address these questions 
by examining the evolution of the relationship between bid-ask spreads and the two fundamental costs 
of providing liquidity: securities’ interest rate risk and the expected time between trades.  
 A market maker builds the expected costs of its services, including financing a position and 
bearing its price risk, into the bid-ask spread charged to customers. We use two variables to capture 
these costs. The first is time-to-trade, TTT, as defined in Section 2.2. The realized time since the last 
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trade serves as a proxy for the expected time that the liquidity provider must wait until another trade 
arrives to take the position off his hands. We define TTT as the average of the time since the last sell 
and the time since the last buy to reduce the noise in this expectation, while still allowing it to pick 
up high-frequency changes in the trading environment. The second variable is the duration of the 
security, which represents the price risk per unit of time borne by the liquidity provider between 
trades, which we denote itDur . The intuition is that the cross section of the securities’ interest rate 
risks is roughly proportional to the securities’ durations.  
Panel B of Figure 5 plots the monthly average levels of TTT and Dur . There is a strong 
upward trend in the time between Treasury transactions, more than doubling from mid-2008 to mid-
2011. The drop in transaction frequency could result from either a general drying up of liquidity, or 
a drying up on this particular platform, TradeWeb. The database does not reveal TradeWeb’s market 
share, but news reports and anecdotal evidence point strongly to a general trend of worsening market 
conditions, while the market share of electronic platforms such as TradeWeb has likely expanded.25 
The time between trades reaches a local peak around the end of 2008, as does the level of interest rate 
risk, which spikes again in mid-2009. 
We relate bid-ask spreads to the two variables in the following regression model  
1, 2,it t t it t it itSpread TTT Dur          (5) 
where Spreadit denotes the bid-ask spread for security i on day t. To allow the relation to change over 
time, we run a separate cross-sectional regression for each day t in the sample. The coefficient on 
                                                            
25 For example, Bloomberg reported on March 29, 2015 (Kruger and McCormick, 2015), that Treasury trading by primary 
dealers shrank from 13 percent of the amount outstanding in 2007 to just 4.1 percent in 2015, and also that “…electronic 
trading of Treasuries has proliferated over the past decade and now accounts for 44 percent of all transactions.”  A July 
13, 2015, Wall Street Journal article (Burne, 2015) cites data from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA) that show it would take 25 days for the entire universe of Treasury securities to turn over, compared 
to 8 days in 2005. So, there is abundant evidence that the increasing time between the electronic trades at TradeWeb 
reflects a general downward liquidity trend, rather than a trend away from electronic trading platforms such as TradeWeb. 
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TTT, β1,t, provides an estimate of the price charged per unit of time, on date t, to finance a position 
until the expected arrival of next trade. The coefficient on itDur , β2,t, estimates the price charged over 
this same holding period to bear the position’s interest rate risk. We present the results graphically in 
Figure 6, which has one bold line for each of the two coefficients along with lighter dashed lines 
showing confidence bounds. The graph shows monthly averages of the coefficient and confidence 
bounds from the daily regressions.  
 The time series of coefficients make two main points. First, the price charged per unit of 
financing time (β1,t) surged when bid-ask spreads surged; both peak in September 2008, when Lehman 
failed, and both are higher in the first half of 2009 compared to the second half. Second, the price 
charged per unit of holding-period price risk (β2,t) increased in late 2008 and again in early 2009, 
which contributed to the increase and slow decline of spreads in 2009, particularly for longer duration 
securities.  
 So to the question of why spreads increased so much, at the time when prices diverged so 
much, these results deliver an answer with two parts. First, the price charged by market makers for 
financing, i.e. for access to their balance sheets, spiked dramatically after the Lehman bankruptcy and 
again in early 2009. In combination with a rise in the quantity of financing needed, due to the 
slowdown in trading (Figure 5B), bid-ask spreads increased for particularly illiquid securities. 
Second, the price charged for interest rate risk rose, which increased spreads for more risky securities.  
The spike in the price charged for financing can help explain the divergence between bond 
and note prices.26  Not only did bonds trade less often than similar notes, the price charged for the 
lack of liquidity increased. To put the effect in perspective, in the first month of our sample (June 
2008), the average estimated coefficients on TTT is 0.15, and at the peak of the bid-ask spread (March 
                                                            
26 Interest rate risk cannot explain the difference in bid-ask spreads since the replicating portfolios have identical 
duration by construction. 
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2009), the coefficient becomes 1.58, a more than 10-fold increase. Based on the sample-average value 
of TTT (0.92 days), the increase in the coefficient implies a 1.3 basis point increase in the bid-ask 
spread for an average security. Combined with a widening of the gap in TTT between bonds and notes 
shown in Figure 5B, the estimates suggest that the difference in bid-ask spreads between bonds and 
notes reached about 4 basis points due to a slowdown in trading and an increase in the price charged 
by market makers to bear this risk. As shown in Figure 5A, the actual gap in bid-ask spreads reached 
nearly 15 basis points in early 2009, which suggests that additional factors beyond those in our model 
– such as alternative liquidity differences or scope for informed trading – also contributed to 
differences in bid-ask spreads across the bonds and notes. 
 There is also a notable change in the price to bear interest rate risk, as the coefficient on Dur 
roughly triples between the start of the sample and early 2009. This increase accounts for about three-
quarters of the increase in the average security’s spread, from trough to peak, shown in Figure 4B. 
The remainder is due to the increases in average TTT and the coefficient on TTT.27   
In the June 2008 to March 2009 sub-sample, the regression results suggest that most of the 
changes in the distribution of bid-ask spreads are due to changes in prices rather than changes in 
quantities of financing or interest-rate risk. Panel B of Figure 6 shows the average predicted bid-ask 
spread for all 10-year notes in our sample as compared to the average predicted spread for all 30-year 
bonds. Bid-ask spreads for the less liquid securities are clearly higher, and this divergence increases 
in the crisis period.28  The larger contribution of price vis-à-vis quantity is consistent with the 
empirical facts reported in the Federal Reserve Bank of New York’s Treasury market liquidity 
overview (Adrian, 2013), which states “bid-ask spreads increased dramatically during the financial 
crisis, despite the sharp increase in volume. The increase in bid-ask spreads reflect uncertainty at that 
                                                            
27 The duration of the average security remained roughly constant during the sample period. 
28 Since this analysis includes securities other than the maturity-matched pairs, the 30-year bonds have longer average 
duration, which contributes to the difference in predicted bid-ask spreads.  
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time, as well as the reduced balance sheet capacity of dealers.”  However, our results suggest that the 
increase in spreads had a more pronounced effect on illiquid securities, which resulted in spreads 
increasing more for 30-year bonds relative to 10-year notes.  
The estimates shown in Figure 6 also shed some light on why average bid-ask spreads end up 
higher in late 2011 than they started before the Lehman bankruptcy, as shown in Figure 4. The 
estimated coefficients on TTT and Dur largely returned to their pre-crisis levels by the end of 2009, 
which we interpret as a reversion of prices charged for the risk of slower trading frequency and 
changes in interest rates to their pre-crisis levels. The rise in average bid-ask spreads is attributable, 
therefore, to the steady increase in TTT that happened over the period, particularly for 30-year bonds. 
The “new normal” environment appears to entail larger bid-ask spreads due to the higher costs of 
intermediation in the post crisis environment. 
6. Conclusion 
The importance of better understanding market liquidity pricing remains paramount amid 
episodes of extreme changes in liquidity; trading can concentrate in the most liquid securities and 
effectively evaporate from the least liquid securities. Normal arbitrage relationships have resumed 
since the crisis. However, unusual and sudden price movements continue to affect not only the 
Treasury market, but also corporate debt, equities, and derivatives. Market liquidity is often cited as 
an explanation, but the precise mechanism that relates a security’s liquidity to its price, and the way 
in which the effects of this relationship can be exacerbated, is not well understood. Our setting is ideal 
for understanding this relationship since Treasury securities vary in few other dimensions, and we 
have straightforward methods for accounting for differences in the timing of cash flows.  
Our analysis makes several contributions to the understanding of liquidity pricing. The first is 
simply the unprecedented magnitude of the price effect among perfectly-matched securities with 
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equal and nearly perfect credit quality, all within a single market. The low explicit cost of executing 
the arbitrage through to convergence points to a role for frictions and/or implicit costs affecting the 
security choices of investors. Second, with our data on investor transactions, we ask what drives the 
demand for the more-liquid securities and find that investors sort into securities based on their own 
expected need for market liquidity. As predicted in the model of Amihud and Mendelson (1986), 
investors with a shorter horizon amortize any transaction costs over only that timeframe, and hence 
have higher demand for more liquid securities. Combined with market makers who rationally price 
their services according to the risks that buying or selling a security imposes, the sorting of investors 
creates a liquidity feedback effect, as in the model of Dow (2004). Investors that expect to transact 
more frequently are attracted to securities with low transactions costs, and market makers are willing 
to keep bid-ask spreads low for securities in which investors transact more often. The heightened 
price of risk charged by market makers during the crisis exacerbates this phenomenon, as the 
difference in bid-ask spreads encourages additional segmentation. Indeed, insurance companies were 
net buyers of the relatively expensive, yet more liquid, securities during the height of the crisis.  
In addition to providing direct evidence of the clientele effect modeled by Amihud and 
Mendelson (1986), our account suggests complementarities between bid-ask spreads and trading 
frequency that can lead to multiple equilibria, as suggested in Dow (2004). A security may be cheap, 
have a large bid-ask spread, and trade infrequently, or be rich, have a low bid-ask spread, and trade 
frequently.  
Dependable price relationships break down in crises, and it is critical for investors and 
policymakers to understand why. Investors pursue strategies based on these relationships, central 
banks infer conditions in financial markets based on these relationships, and bank regulators look for 
signs of stress based on these relationships. We show that differences in liquidity, combined with the 
actions of investors and liquidity providers during a crisis, can contribute to sharp and long-lasting 
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deviations, even in the most typically-dependable pricing relationships. Our results support the idea 
that policies to enhance liquidity in specific securities, such as a re-opening or a securities lending 
program, could dampen the liquidity feedback effect that might otherwise spiral to an extreme. 
Strategies to bolster market resilience to liquidity shocks are especially relevant as investors’ adjust 
to more conservative post-crisis market norms and liquidity providers navigate still evolving 
regulatory-related costs to market-making. 
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Figure 1.  Price Difference between Maturity‐Matched Treasury Securities 
Panel A: Individual Maturity‐Matched Pairs 
 
Panel B: Average of Maturity‐Matched Pairs 
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Panel A shows the monthly-average in price difference of maturity-matched Treasury security portfolios with 
identical cash flows; each pair is represented by a separate line.  Each price difference subtracts the price of a 10-year original 
issue note from that of a replicating portfolio that consists of a 30-year original-issue bond plus a STRIP that matures on the 
same date.  Each series starts with the date that the pair’s 10-year original issue note becomes off-the-run.  The maturity dates 
of the nine pairs range from February 2, 2015 to May 15, 2015.  Panel B shows the cross-sectional average over the spreads 
show in Panel A. 
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Figure 2.  Notes versus Bonds, November 20, 2008 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  This figure shows the yield curve for 10-year and 30-year original-issue Treasury notes and bonds on November 
20, 2008.  Each point represents the actual yield-to-maturity of a different security on this date.  The blue stars represent 
Treasury bonds.  The black dots represent Treasury notes.  The yield is given in percentage points on the vertical axis and 
years-to-maturity are in years on the horizontal axis.   
 
 
Bond‐Notes Pairs 
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Figure 3.  Overnight Treasury Funding Market 
 
 
Panel A:  GC and Specials Rates 
  
Panel B:  Cumulative Net Funding Costs 
  
 
Panel C:  Treasury Specials Transactions and Treasury Fails 
 
 
 
Figure 3.  All panels in this figure represent monthly averages. Panel A shows overnight repo rates in percentage points, annualized. The solid black line is the 
overnight special repo rate averaged across the off-the-run Treasury notes comprising the nine matched portfolios in our sample, using transaction rates from a large 
inter-dealer broker. The dotted blue line is the overnight Treasury GC repo rate, obtained from Bloomberg. Panel B shows the running sum of the GC minus specials 
rate from Panel A, the cumulative net funding cost to the bond/note trade. In Panel C, the dashed blue line shows the number of overnight Treasury special repo 
transactions in our sample, referencing the scale on the left vertical axis. The solid black line shows the volume of Treasury fails in $ billions, referencing the scale on 
the right vertical axis, as reported by primary dealers to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
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Figure 4.  Security Liquidity Characteristics 
Panel A:  Average Price Deviations by Security Size Quartile 
 
Panel B:  Average Bid‐Ask Spread  
 
Figure 4.  Panel A shows the monthly average fitting error for each security size quartile.  The sold blue line represents the 
quartile with the smallest securities, and the dashed red line represents the quartile with the largest securities.  The vertical 
axis is measured in percentage points.  Panel B shows the monthly average bid-ask spread (in price terms) for all off-the-run 
Treasury security observations in our sample. The data are from the TradeWeb platform. The vertical axis is measured in 
basis points.  
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Figure 5.  Liquidity Fundamentals 
Panel A:  Average Bid‐Ask Spread  
 
Panel B:  Average TTT and Duration 
 
Figure 5.  This figure shows the monthly average of the Bid-Ask Spread, TTT  and Duration for various coupon-paying 
Treasury securities in our sample.  Panel A shows the Bid-Ask Spread.  Panel B shows TTT and Duration.  In both Panels A 
and B, the dashed yellow and blue lines represent average values over 10- and 30-year Treasury securities, respectively.  In 
Panel B, the solid black line shows average TTT , which is measured in days, referencing the scale on the left vertical axis, 
over all bonds and notes in our sample.  This panel also shows the average level of TTT for 10-year notes, and the average 
level of TTT for 30-year bonds in our sample.  The solid orange line shows average Duration referencing the scale on the 
right vertical axis. Duration is measured in years.   
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Figure 6.   Monthly Regressions of Bid‐Ask Spread on TTT and Duration 
 
Monthly Regression Coefficient Estimates (Dependent Variable:  Bid‐Ask Spreadit) 
  
 
 
Figure 6.  The figure shows the monthly-averages of coefficient estimates and 95 percent confidence intervals for a series of 
daily, cross-sectional multivariate regressions of the itSpreadBid Ask  onto itTTT  and itDur  for each security i on each 
day t, where the itSpreadBid Ask is measured in basis points. The solid, black line shows the point estimates for TTT. The 
solid, orange line shows the point estimates for Dur.  The corresponding color, thin dashed lines show the confidence intervals 
for the respective coefficient estimates.  
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Table 1. Treasury Security Characteristics 
 
 
 
Table 1.  Panels A and B show summary statistics for our liquidity proxies, which differ for each individual Treasury security. Panel A shows the means and standard 
deviations of our variables in aggregate (All Coupons), and also by original issue maturity bucket.  The share of a security that is stripped and the dollar amount 
outstanding are from the Treasury’s Statement of Monthly Debt.  Bid-ask spreads are from the TradeWeb trading platform.  Trading volume is that of U.S. insurance 
companies. 
Panel  A:   Means  and  Standard  Deviations  
Bid‐Ask Spread Amount Out Share Stripped Age TTM Volume/Day Coupon Duration Time‐to‐Trade
(basis points) ($bn) (share of security) (years) (years) ($mn) (percent) (years) (Days)
Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
All Coupons 3.24 3.11 23.88 11.03 0.04 0.09 5.08 6.58 4.29 3.53 44.80 75.95 4.31 2.19 3.62 2.53 0.92 1.78
2‐Year 1.61 0.65 32.12 7.78 0.00 0.00 0.94 0.50 1.06 0.50 41.33 132.90 2.82 1.62 1.05 0.49 0.35 0.61
3‐Year 1.90 0.64 31.38 7.68 0.01 0.01 1.26 0.76 1.74 0.76 19.33 57.68 2.40 1.46 1.70 0.74 0.46 0.82
5‐Year 2.58 1.18 20.35 8.42 0.01 0.02 2.31 1.33 2.69 1.33 82.24 206.64 3.65 0.93 2.55 1.22 0.79 1.27
10‐Year 3.44 1.67 28.24 11.92 0.02 0.03 4.53 2.69 5.48 2.69 85.43 191.01 4.50 0.76 4.80 2.21 0.33 0.76
30‐Year 6.89 6.14 12.08 6.14 0.21 0.15 19.69 2.84 10.32 2.85 16.94 94.01 8.55 1.06 7.40 1.63 2.86 3.25
STRIPS 11.65 8.28 0.85 0.65 N/A N/A N/A N/A 4.84 2.84 4.13 19.51 N/A N/A 4.84 2.84 6.18 5.36
Panel  B:   Correlations
Bid‐Ask Spread Amount Out Share Stripped         Age       TTM Volume/Day      Coupon Duration         Time‐to‐Trade
Bid‐Ask Spread 1.00
Amount Out ‐0.33 1.00
Share Stripped 0.35 ‐0.50 1.00
Age 0.43 ‐0.61 0.60 1.00
TTM 0.38 ‐0.24 0.42 0.24 1.00
Volume ‐0.10 ‐0.02 0.03 0.00 0.01 1.00
Coupon 0.45 ‐0.75 0.68 0.76 0.36 0.03 1.00
Duration 0.39 ‐0.24 0.52 0.32 0.94 0.01 0.52 1.00
Time‐to‐Trade 0.20 ‐0.41 0.31 0.36 0.09 0.02 0.36 0.09 1.00
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Table 2.  Insurer Characteristics 
 
Table 2.  This table shows summary statistics for insurer-level characteristics.  Annuity is an indicator variable equal to 1 if an insurer has a business focus on annuities, 
and 0 otherwise, defined based on the insurer writing more than 50% of its business in annuities.  RBC is an indicator equal to 1 if an insurer has an RBC ratio above 
the median insurer ratio, and 0 otherwise.  Net Income is an indicator variable equal to 1 if net income is positive, and 0 otherwise.  Churn is the ratio of an insurer’s 
trading volume relative to holdings.  Hold Horizon is the volume-weighted average number of years that an insurer holds a Treasury security.  The sample period is 
January 1, 2006 through September 30, 2011. 
Panel  A:   Means  and  Standard  Deviations  
Assets Capital/Assets Annuity    RBC Net Income Churn Holding Horizon
# of  ($bn) (%) (%) (%) (%) (ratio) (years)
Insurers Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev Mean St Dev
All Insurers 2327 3.21 17.11 45.65 25.83 4.41 20.54 50.04 50.00 76.29 42.53 0.08 0.14 2.53 1.49
Health 330 0.35 0.91 59.09 20.41 0.00 0.00 31.70 46.53 75.82 42.82 0.09 0.20 2.10 1.11
Life 571 10.85 32.97 30.79 27.28 18.38 38.74 53.36 49.89 71.02 45.37 0.10 0.18 2.50 1.64
P&C 1426 0.90 4.64 48.39 23.66 0.00 0.00 52.90 49.92 78.43 41.13 0.07 0.09 2.63 1.49
Panel  B:   Correlations  
Assets        Capital/Assets Annuity    RBC > Median    Net Income > 0       Churn Hold Horiz
Assets 1.00
Capital/Assets ‐0.22 1.00
Annuity Focus 0.38 ‐0.24 1.00
RBC > Median RBC ‐0.03 0.43 ‐0.01 1.00
Net Income > 0 ‐0.01 0.12 ‐0.05 0.11 1.00
Churn 0.24 ‐0.12 0.13 ‐0.08 0.00 1.00
Hold Horizon ‐0.10 0.12 ‐0.05 0.14 0.01 ‐0.34 1.00
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Table 3. Fitting Errors and Treasury Security Liquidity 
Dependent	Variable:		Fitting	Errori,t
Panel	A:		Characteristics	that	Differ	by	Security
Bid‐Aski,t ‐3.42*** ‐3.48*** ‐3.40***
(0.31) (0.26) (0.26)
ln(Out)i,t 20.77*** 17.17*** 16.87*** 15.92***
(3.07) (4.86) (4.13) (4.25)
ShrStripi,t ‐97.20*** ‐94.52*** ‐94.36***
(13.62) (18.69) (17.64)
ln(Age)i,t ‐5.23*** 0.47 4.04*** 3.26***
(0.86) (1.04) (1.04) (1.04)
Volumei,t 38.23*** 15.50*** 14.99***
(7.78) (3.90) (3.90)
Couponi,t ‐3.59*** ‐1.98** 0.68 1.62**
(0.38) (0.86) (0.80) (0.74)
ln(TTM)i,t ‐0.02 3.99*** 8.27*** 7.30***
(1.69) (1.48) (1.52) (1.51)
Pairi,t 49.41*** 24.95***
(12.12) (7.78)
R‐Squared 0.084 0.087 0.079 0.043 0.002 0.055 0.000 0.048 0.099 0.191 0.201
Observations 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873
Dependent	Variable:		Fitting	Errori,t
Panel	B:		Security	Characteristics	Interacted	with	Aggregate	Liquidity
Bid‐Aski,t ‐1.30* 0.17 0.23
(0.70) (0.97) (0.90)
ln(Out)i,t ‐33.63*** ‐21.31*** ‐20.94*** ‐18.81***
(5.57) (7.28) (6.58) (7.00)
ShrStripi,t 98.04*** 53.37** 57.89***
(18.99) (22.98) (22.10)
ln(Age)i,t 9.82*** 0.53 ‐0.06 1.76
(1.77) (2.62) (2.45) (2.52)
Volumei,t ‐15.49 15.77 15.08
(17.61) (11.45) (11.33)
Couponi,t 6.32*** 4.47*** 0.79 ‐0.36
(0.71) (1.65) (1.87) (1.82)
ln(TTM)i,t 0.34 ‐5.20*** ‐8.15*** ‐7.26***
(2.40) (1.99) (2.07) (2.23)
Pairi,t ‐55.86*** 11.78*** ‐0.31*** ‐12.94
(18.39) (3.42) (0.11) (13.30)
AggLiqt*Bid‐Aski,t ‐0.34*** ‐0.26**
(0.09) (0.11)
AggLiqt*ln(Outi,t) 16.64*** 0.31 11.53*** 10.50***
(2.42) (1.14) (2.97) (3.13)
AggLiqt*ShrStripi,t ‐61.58*** ‐47.33*** ‐48.84***
(8.40) (10.93) (10.22)
AggLiqt*ln(Age)i,t ‐4.59*** 1.07 0.07
(0.74) (1.05) (1.11)
AggLiqt*Volumei,t 16.80** ‐2.02** 0.56 0.81
(6.98) (0.79) (4.24) (4.21)
AggLiqt*Couponi,t ‐3.02*** ‐0.19 0.54
(0.31) (0.86) (0.83)
AggLiqt*ln(TTM)i,t ‐0.11 2.51*** 4.24*** 3.59***
(1.19) (0.87) (0.93) (0.99)
AggLiqt*Pairi,t 32.36*** 12.32**
(8.84) (6.29)
R‐Squared 0.088 0.196 0.166 0.115 0.003 0.133 0.000 0.096 0.216 0.295 0.311
Observations 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873 207,873
44 
 
 
Table 3.  This table presents a panel regression of fitting errors on security characteristics.  The Fitting Error, the dependent variable, 
is defined as the difference between the actual price of the security and the fitted price based on a smoothed yield curve, measured in 
basis points.  Volume is trading volume of U.S. insurance companies.  Volume for each security on each day is the ratio of the trading 
volume for that security relative to the sum of volume for all securities on that day.  Coupon is measured in percentage points per year.  
Pair is a dummy equal to 1 for a note and -1 for a bond in cases where both the note and bond have the same maturity date, and 0 for 
all other securities.  Panel A shows univariate and multivariate results for characteristics that differ by security.  Panel B shows results 
for specifications that include interaction effects between security characteristics and AggLiqt, which is a time series proxy for market-
wide liquidity.  The variable AggLiqt is the average bid-ask spread over all securities in our sample on day t.  Calendar day fixed effects 
are included in each regression.  Standard errors (in parentheses) account for clustering within security i and arbitrary heteroskedasticity; 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 4.  Insurer Transaction Patterns 
 
 
Table 4.  This table presents a pooled regression of insurance companies’ monthly net purchases of Treasury security i for insurer j in 
month t on the fitting error for each security i at time t.  Net purchases are measured per $1 billion of the security’s original issue size.  
The fitting error is defined as the difference between the actual price of the security and the fitted price based on a smoothed yield curve, 
measured in basis points.  Month-of-year fixed effects and insurer type fixed effects are included in all regressions.  The sample period 
is January 2006 through August 2011. Standard errors are shown in brackets beneath the coefficient estimates; *** indicates significance 
at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.   
 
  
Dependent	Variable:		Net	Purchase	of	Treasuryi,j,t
Insurer	Type: All Health Life	 P&C
Fitting	Errorijt 3.21*** 1.72*** 8.27*** 1.57**
(0.76) (0.27) (2.67) (0.65)
R‐Squared 0.0039 0.0119 0.0045 0.0024
Observations 31,895,768 4,298,496 7,683,239 19,914,033
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Table 5.  Who Engages in the Arbitrage? 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.  This table presents results from a pooled regression of an insurance company’s monthly net purchases of Treasury security i 
for insurer j in month t on the fitting error for each security i at time t interacted with various characteristics of the insurance company.  
The fitting error is defined as the difference between the actual price of the security and the fitted price based on a smoothed yield curve, 
measured in basis points.  Net purchases are measured per $1 billion of the security’s issue size.  The sample period is January 1, 2006 
through September 30, 2011.  Month fixed effects and insurer type fixed effects are included in all regressions.  Standard errors are in 
parentheses; *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, ** at the 5 percent level, and * at the 10 percent level.   
 
 
Dependent	Variable:		Net	Purchases	of	Treasuryi,j,t
Capital/Assetsj,t	*	FEt ‐0.12*** ‐0.01***
(0.03) (0.00)
Capital/Assetsj,t 0.87 0.12
(1.10) (0.14)
Annuityj	*	FEt 16.27*** 1.25***
(3.67) (0.40)
Annuityj ‐344.19** ‐32.82**
(137.96) (14.61)
RBCj,t	*	FEt ‐2.04 0.11
(1.57) (0.18)
RBCj,t	 ‐28.12 ‐6.62
(55.24) (6.55)
Net	Incomej,t*	FEt 1.44 0.34*
(1.64) (0.18)
Net	Incomej,t ‐9.72 ‐0.78
(63.25) (6.74)
Churnj	*	FEt 29.04*** 1.84***
(5.62) (0.67)
Churnj ‐44.42 10.38
(191.94) (23.07)
Hold	Horizonj	*	FEt ‐6.11*** ‐0.36**
(1.30) (0.15)
Hold	Horizonj	 45.90 5.11
(45.41) (5.33)
FEt	(Fitting	Error) 8.64*** 2.47*** 4.30*** 2.25* 0.92 7.91*** 0.55**
(1.53) (0.78) (1.12) (1.35) (0.88) (1.26) (0.24)
R‐Squared 0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0039 0.0040 0.0040 0.0044
Observations 31,895,768 31,895,768 31,895,768 31,895,768 31,895,768 31,895,768 31,895,768
